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Executive Summary  
Ever since the devastating attacks of 9/11, America has made terrorism prevention a top 
priority, and the Department of Homeland Security has transferred billions of dollars to states 
in Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism programs. However, there has been much debate 
on how these funds are allocated, many speculating that some states receive more funding 
than others as “pork.”   
 
Basing an analysis of funding on a variety of determinants, it can be concluded that this 
speculation might very well be the case. An analysis of allocation of federal Homeland Security 
funds to states was conducted, hypothesizing the following variables were determinants of 
funding: population, gross domestic product (GDP), level of threat, if the political party of the 
state’s elected Governor matches that of the sitting President, whether the state’s Electoral 
College Representatives voted for the winning President, whether the state Homeland Security 
Office is paired with the Division of Emergency Management (or Public Safety), and if the state 
has representatives on an Appropriations Subcommittee for Homeland Security.   
 
The results conclude that population, GDP, being paired with Emergency Management, a 
state’s Electoral College Representatives voting for the winning president, and a state having 
Representatives on a Subcommittee of Appropriations on Homeland Security influence federal 
funding. Threat, however, has no influence on funding allocation, a finding that can raise a lot 
of questions. 
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Problem Statement & Research Question  
After the events of 9/11, there is no denying that the threat of terrorism is real; although 
the level of threat that terrorism still poses is an issue that is debatable. In an effort to 
enhance the safety of American citizens, the Department of Homeland Security was created, 
with the mission to “ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism 
and other hazards.”1 Since 2003, Homeland Security has allocated approximately $31 
billion in grants to states. Arguably, this large amount of money has been effective in 
keeping the U.S. safe, since there has not been a successful large-scale terrorist attack since 
2001. Ideally, the safety and security of each individual citizen would be addressed equally, 
and Homeland Security funding to states would follow a specific measurement system, 
ensuring that funding is proportional to state population and is allocated based on a level of 
threat estimated by a reliable and inclusive risk estimation model. However, there has been 
much speculation that representatives may be using Federal Homeland Security funding to 
states as pork, or in other terms, that representatives are influencing the allocation of funds 
to benefit their states. This speculation has circulated so much that even Representatives 
are speaking up, Congressman Chris Cox (R-California) stating, “This should be all about 
national security, and less about pork and politics.”2 
 This misallocation of funds potentially leads to some states receiving disproportionally 
higher amounts of funding, and in turn, other states might end up receiving insufficient 
                                                        
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Our Mission: Overview.” Accessed March 30th, 2012. 
http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission 
2 Earle, Geoff. 2004. “This Should be All About Homeland Security, and Less About Pork and Politics, 
Homeland Security Money has Not Been Flowing to the Places in Danger, and Some Members are Worried.” 
The Hill. Available September 8, 2006. Accessed March 31, 2013. 
http://www.hillnews.com/news/040704/security.aspx 
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funding, thus potentially reducing the security of the citizens and critical infrastructure of 
those states.  So, on what basis is Homeland Security funding distributed to states? That is, 
what are the determinants of funding to states? 
Literature Review 
Homeland Security Grant Funding Overview  
In order to understand on what basis funds are allocated, one must first understand the 
venues through which funds are allocated. The Homeland Security Grant Program, created 
in 2003, is the “primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local 
partners to take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist 
attack and to respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe.”3 Federal 
Homeland Security funds are distributed to states through these grants. There are several 
Homeland Security Grant Programs, but the most funded (and thus consequential), are the 
following six programs: 
 Citizen Corps Program (CCP); 
 Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG); 
 State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP); 
 Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP); 
 Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS); 
 And the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). 
A short description of each program’s main purposes is located in Table 1.  
                                                        
3 Masse, Todd. O’Neil, Sioban. Rollins, John. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33858. “The Department 
of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress.” 
Published February 2, 2007. Accessed March 29th, 2012.  
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Table 1: Description of Programs  
4 
                                                        
4 Maguire, Steven. Reese, Shawn. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33770. “Department of Homeland 
Security Grants to States and Local Governments FY2003 to FY2006.” Published December 22, 2006. 
Accessed March 31, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33770.pdf 
Grant Program Short Description  
Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention 
Program (LETPP) 
In FY2004 DHS appropriations, Congress directed DHS to establish a 
local law enforcement terrorism prevention program for states and 
localities. LETPP provides funds to support activities to establish and 
enhance state and local law enforcement efforts to prevent and 
respond to terrorist attacks. 
Citizen Corps Program 
(CCP) 
Created to coordinate volunteer organizations with the mission to make 
local communities safe and prepared to respond to any emergency 
situation. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) is the only 
program that the Citizen Corps administers that funds volunteer first 
responders. Smallest of the programs analyzed in this study. 
Emergency Management 
Performance Grant 
Program (EMPG) 
Designed to assist in the development, maintenance, and improvement 
of state and local emergency management capabilities. It provides 
support to state and local governments to achieve measurable results in 
key functional areas of emergency management.  
State Homeland Security 
Grant Program (SHSGP) 
Authorizes purchase of specialized equipment to enhance state and 
local agencies’ capability in preventing and responding to WMD 
incidents and other terrorist incidents, and provides funds for 
protecting critical infrastructure, and for designing, developing, 
conducting, and evaluating terrorism response exercises; developing 
and conducting counter-terrorism training programs; and updating and 
implementing each state’s Homeland Security Strategy.  
Metropolitan Medical 
Response System (MMRS) 
Discretionary program that assists DHS-selected jurisdictions with 
funding to develop plans and training, and conduct exercises related to 
terrorist attacks. Funding is intended to enhance jurisdictions’ capability 
in responding to WMD mass casualty events. 
Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) 
Discretionary program that provides funding to high-risk, high-threat 
urban areas (including counties and mutual aid partners), to prepare 
for, prevent, and respond to terrorist incidents.  
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The next question is, what factors, if any, influence the Homeland Security Grant Program? 
Many of us have heard the scandalous stories of improper use of spending: states using 
grant funding to purchase items such as 13 sno-cone machines in Michigan, a $98,000 
underwater robot in Columbus, Ohio, and an armored vehicle for a tiny New Hampshire 
town that uses it to patrol the annual pumpkin festival.5 These stories of excessive 
spending can be infuriating, especially to tax payers when the economy is in an extended 
slow recovery from recession, and government budgets are highly stressed. 
One reasoning behind this improper use of money could be the fact that every state is 
ensured 0.75 percent of all Homeland Security Grant Program funding. This leads to a big 
discrepancy in per-capita funding. For instance, in 2004, citizens of Wyoming (the least 
populous state in the U.S.) received $40.64 in funding per citizen; New York, on the other 
hand, only received $8.94 per citizen.6 Some states have a lesser population to ensure the 
safety of, and may have a much lower risk of a terrorist attack, yet receive 
disproportionally more funds per capita than higher populated, higher risk states. In turn, 
some of the former states may have received more money than they can spend reasonably 
(thus the purchase of sno-cone makers).  
Of course, there may be underlying factors that influence how much funding each state 
gets. When the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Grant 
Program, was first created in 2003, they used a basic funding formula to ensure that all 
                                                        
5 Solomon, John. “Senator Slams Homeland Program for Wasteful, Frivolous Spending.” The Washington 
Guardian. Published December 14, 2012. Accessed March 31, 2013.http://www.washingtonguardian.com/ 
homelands-urban-follies-0 
6 Maguire, Steven. Reese, Shawn. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33770. “Department of Homeland 
Security Grants to States and Local Governments FY2003 to FY2006.” Published December 22, 2006. 
Accessed March 31, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33770.pdf 
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states received funding.  In the beginning, Homeland Security based its funding equations 
on population, each state receiving 0.75 percent of total funds, and the rest of the funds 
being allocated based on population; the only exceptions were the Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) and Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), which were 
completely discretionary programs, in which funds were allocated based on risk as 
determined by the Department of Homeland Security. The fair-share approach to most of 
the grant programs lasted for three years until 2006, when Congress forced DHS to change 
their fair-share formulas to better incorporate risk through the DHS Appropriations Act. 
The formula changed for the LETPP and SHSGP, in which all states would still receive .75 
percent of the funds, but the remainder of funds for these programs would be allocated 
based on risk. The criteria are listed in Table 2.  
This shift from fair-share non-discretionary allocation to risk-based discretionary funding 
opens up the question of whether or not political factors influence discretionary program 
funding to states. It is important to note that although Congress determines how much 
funding the Department of Homeland Security receives for its grant programs, and 
monitors spending, Homeland Security is ultimately the one who makes decisions on how 
funds are allocated to states.  
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Table 2: Grant Program Formulas 
Program  2003 2004 2005 2006 
CCP Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
EMPG Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
LETPP Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to risk.  
SHSGP  Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to 
population share. 
Each state gets 0.75 
percent of total 
funds, the remaining 
funds distributed 
according to risk.  
MMRS All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
UASI All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
All funds distributed 
according to risk.  
 
Applied analysis  
When beginning my capstone, I first looked to previously conducted research and analyses; 
unfortunately, there are only a few published academic analyses regarding the 
determinants of Homeland Security Grant Program funding. This could perhaps be because 
the Department of Homeland Security has only existed for 10 years, a relatively short time 
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in comparison to many other governmental agencies. Only two sources report research 
similar to my Capstone, and even at that, there are quite a few major differences in our 
approaches.  
Prante and Bohora  
In their study “What Determines Homeland Security Spending?: An Econometric analysis of 
the Homeland Security Grant Program,” Prante and Bohora focus their study on the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP),LETPP, CCP, and UASI programs from the years 
2004-2006. In determining their independent variables, they include a variety of political 
affluences, their model being: 
FUNDINGf = < RISK, POLITICS, POWER > 
(Where RISK is a vector of one or more variables measuring a state’s risk of terrorist attack, 
POLITICS is a vector of one or more variables measuring the party affiliation of a state’s 
elected officials, and POWER is a vector of one or more variables measuring the 
connectedness or influence of a state’s elected officials within Congress.) 
The vector POLITICS is comprised of a constructed index variable, BLUE-RED-INDEX, 
measuring the party affiliation of the elected officials in a state. BLUE-RED-INDEX is the 
sum of four variables: BUSH-2000 and BUSH- 2004 are indicator variables coded as 1 if a 
state was carried by George W. Bush in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, 
respectively. R-SENATE is the proportion of a state’s Senators who are Republican and R-
HOUSE is the proportion of a state’s Representatives who are Republican. BUSH-2000, 
BUSH-2004, R-SENATE, and R-HOUSE are summed to create BLUE- RED-INDEX.  
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The vector Power is based on the potential influence of states’ elected officials, assigning a 
value of 1 if a state’s elected official is: Speaker of the House, House Majority or Minority 
Leader, Senate Majority or Minority Leader, House Majority or Minority Whip, Senate 
Majority or Minority Whip, a member of the House DHS committee, or the Chair or ranking 
minority member of any House or Senate Committee (including committees not involved in 
Homeland Security Appropriations). They also include a variety of variables such as 
population, whether or not a state is a border or coastal state, and per capita income of a 
state. For the Vector RISK, they use the AIR Terrorism Loss Estimation Model.  
AIR, a private company has created a Terrorism Loss Estimation Model, in which they 
categorize states as high, medium, or low risk security states based on 10 catastrophic risks 
(although it does not include natural disasters). Convening terrorism experts and former 
employees of the FBI, CIA, and Department of Defense, AIR developed its model is through 
an application of the Delphi method, in which critical infrastructure, tourist attraction, and 
high profile targets are included in assessing risk.7 Although I could not attain access to the 
exact variables they include in their model, it seems to be a sound and inclusive estimator 
of risk.  
Performing an OLS regression analysis, they conclude in their results that RISK is indeed a 
positive and statistically significant determinant of funding, disproving the notion that 
funds are being allocated as pork instead of risk or threat. 8 
 
                                                        
7 AIR Worldwide. Terrorism Loss Estimation Model. Accessed March 31, 2013. http://www.air-
worldwide.com/Models/Terrorism/ 
8
 Prante, Tyler, and Alok K. Bohara. 2008. What determines homeland security spending? An econometric 
analysis of the Homeland Security Grant Program. Policy Studies Journal 36 (2). 
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Goerdel  
In a recent similar study, Holly Goerdel found results concluding the opposite of Prante and 
Bohora. In her study, she studies whether politics versus risk determines government 
spending across the Citizen Corps Program (CCP), State Homeland Security Grant Program 
(SHSGP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI), programs from the years 2004-2006. Her findings support 
politics over risk when programs are designed to award universal benefits to elected 
officials, such as with fair-sharing policies. However, she does conclude that risk explains 
funding when programs award narrow, particularistic benefits, such as with urban security 
initiatives. A key conclusion of her study is that fair-share strategies in grant politics can 
actually produce unfair allocation outcomes in the area of security.  
Although Goerdel and Bohora & Prante use similar models, some of their variables differ 
slightly.  Although Goerdel uses the same measurements for RISK, leadership positions in 
Congress, and a Blue-Red Index for politics, she groups her programs based on 
discretionary and non-discretionary (Universal and Exclusive benefits) and compares the 
regressions of each, which I find more revealing, and prefer as a model.9 
Using their research, I make my first, and perhaps most obvious, hypothesis:  
H1: Those states at a higher risk for terrorism funding will receive more funding 
than those posed with a lower risk. 
In addition, their analysis influenced my choosing of independent variables, especially 
political factors, although there are quite a few differences between them. For instance, I 
                                                        
9  Goerdel, Holly. “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants.” Published December 23, 
2012. Accessed March 31, 2013.  
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take into consideration whether or not a state Homeland Security Office shares a physical 
location with the Division of Emergency Management or Public Safety, and also use a 
different model to estimate risk, as will be discussed later.  
 
Political factors 
Determining the factors that influence Homeland Security Grant Program funding can be 
thought of in terms of V.O. Key’s basic budgeting problem “On what basis shall it be decided 
to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?” Or, in this particular case, “On what 
basis was it determined that Homeland Security awarded grant funds to state A instead of 
state B?”10 
Congressional Dominance Theory  
When thinking of possible political factors, it is a general notion to first look to Congress, 
and the power its members hold. In a study on Congressional Dominance Theory by Moe, 
the author examines just how powerful they are.11 Congressional dominance theory, in its 
simplest terms, says that Congress controls the bureaucracy, and that decision-making in 
Congress is self-interested and specialized.  This is based on politicians’ desire to be re-
elected. In order to get re-elected, politicians gain influence over a set of issues that are 
relevant to their constituency, and the best way to increase their chance is to become 
committee members in those specific policy areas. This theory also contends that the 
                                                        
10 Key, V.O. (1940). The Lack of a Budgetary Theory. The American Political Science Review, 34(6), 
pp.1137-1144.  
11 Moe, T. M. (1987). An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 12(4), pp.475-520.  
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exchange of influence on policy, agenda management, and the symbiotic relationship with 
agencies give Congress control over federal agencies. Because they have this control, the 
congressional dominance theory implies that Congress ultimately has control over 
resource distribution, and in this specific case, Congress would have control over 
Homeland Security Funding to states.  
Congressional Dominance Theory would support the claim that the members of the House 
and Senate Subcommittees of Appropriations on Homeland Security would like to please 
the constituents of their states in order to get re-elected, and one means of doing so would 
be to secure more funds to their state Homeland Security Offices; basically, members of the 
Subcommittees would use Homeland Security Grant funds as “pork,” which leads me to 
hypothesize:  
H2: States with Representatives on the House and Senate Subcommittees of 
Appropriations for Homeland Security receive more Homeland Security Grant 
Program funding than states without. 
Electoral College  
It may be a point of concern that those states supporting George Bush in his campaigns and 
election may have received more funding than those who did not. One may believe that as 
president, and perhaps in order to ensure re-election, he may have wanted to make sure 
his constituents had the best protection available, as might any elected figure; thus, the 
same can be said of Obama. So, it is only natural to assume that states whose Electoral 
College Representatives voted for the winning president would receive more Homeland 
Security Grant Program funding.  
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However, in a study of the political determinants of Federal expenditures at the State level, 
Hoover and Pecorino conclude that Electoral votes are actually negatively associated with 
spending in several categories, with coefficients indicating that the overall effect is large, 
and found evidence that states which voted for the sitting president receive less spending 
per capita compared to states the sitting president lost by a narrow margin. 12 
In this specific case, the following can be hypothesized: 
H3: States whose Electoral College Representatives voted for the winning president 
receive more funding than those states that didn’t.  
State Governor’s Political Party Affiliation  
Each State Homeland Security Office is lead by an executive director or manager who is 
appointed by the state governor. Generally speaking, it is almost assured that this 
appointee’s political party will match that of the governor, considering that it is likely that 
the governor will wish to have someone in charge with the same political ideology as 
him/herself. The same could theoretically be said of the president, who would prefer that 
whoever is in charge of the state’s Homeland Security Office has the same ideology as he 
does, and will be more likely to spend funds in a way supporting his agenda. With this 
reasoning, the following can be hypothesized: 
H4: Those states whose governor’s political party affiliation matches that of the 
sitting president’s will receive more Homeland Security Grant Program funding.  
                                                        
12 Hoover, Gary A., and Paul Pecorino. 2003. “The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State 
Level.” University of Alabama Economics, Finance and Legal Studies Working Paper No. 03-04-01. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=395084  
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Emergency Management 
During my time as an intern at the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security (KOHS), I realized 
that not all state offices of Homeland Security are created equally, or operate in the same 
way. Although KOHS was an extremely small office, we were an independent operation, 
with our own office location. We would work closely with the Division of Emergency 
Management, who was housed in a separate location, but the task was often difficult—non-
responsive emails, difficulty in scheduling meetings without time conflicts, and often 
having to travel to a different location when working on projects. Although physical 
distance does not always impede effective collaboration, and conversely, being located in 
the same building does in no way guarantee collaboration,  the likelihood is greater in the 
latter case.  Many other states, unlike Kentucky, have their Office of Homeland Security and 
Division of Emergency Management, or Division of Public Safety (or both), housed in the 
same office location. The convenience of this arrangement can be expected to be much 
more conducive to getting work done in a timely and efficient manner, and thus, it can be 
argued that those states whose Office of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency 
Management physically share an office location are more productive and efficient. Under 
the assumption that arrangements with a higher likelihood of being effective receive more 
funding, I expect that co-located Homeland Security Offices receive more funding:  
H5: Those states whose Office of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency 
Management physically share an office location receive more Homeland Security 
Grant Program funding than those that do not.  
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Although there is no literature to support this hypothesis, I thought it would be interesting 
and beneficial to include in my analysis.  
Data Collection  
Dependent variables  
It has proven somewhat difficult to collect data in regards to the Homeland Security Grant 
Program. Although data has been published regarding how much the Department of 
Homeland Security has allocated each year through its various programs, it was extremely 
difficult to find data on funds allocated to each individual state. Fortunately, the U.S. Census 
Bureau, along with the U.S. Department of Commerce publishes a “Federal Aid to States 
Report” each year, and I was able to collect information regarding funds allocated to states 
for “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” Programs. This has been published for 
the years 2004-2010; however, this only gives a lump sum of funds granted to states, 
sharing no detail about funds allocated through each individual grant. Analyzing total funds 
could give a broad scope of the determinants influencing grant fund allocation, but I also 
wanted to take a look at what was happening in a narrower spectrum. 
Fortunately, I was able to find a CRS Report that listed Homeland Security Grant Funding 
by individual grant to states; unfortunately, it was only for the years 2003-2006.  
This CRS report has been widely used by those analyzing Homeland Security Grant 
Funding; however, there have been differences in what data is used. For instance, in her 
research, Goerdel focused mainly comparing the SHSGP and UASI programs (the most 
funded), whereas Prante & Bohora focused more individually on each of the four programs 
they analyzed.  However, for the purpose of my analysis, I decided that if figures were 
available for six of the major programs, then it would be interesting to analyze all of them, 
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despite size. The six programs, Citizen Corps Program (CCP), Emergency Management 
Performance Grant Program (EMPG), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), Metropolitan Medical Response 
System (MMRS), and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the first three of which are 
non-discretionary, the latter three discretionary, were analyzed. 
*All funds analyzed were discounted to reflect 2003 real dollars.  
 
Independent Variables 
Risk Factors: Threat  
When it came to determining the independent variables that would influence Homeland 
Security Grant Program Funding, the most basic and vital factor one would think of would 
be threat or risk of a terrorist attack that each state faces. The question is: how do you 
determine risk? Something so interpretive can be hard to get a firm grasp on, and 
definitions and indicators of risk are different for almost every risk or threat analysis. The 
risk assessment model that the Department of Homeland Security uses is unknown, and is 
top secret, as it should be. However, as previously mentioned, Goerdel and Prante & Bohara 
both use the AIR Terrorism Estimation Loss Model.  
For the sake of this analysis, the AIR Model would have been wonderful to use as a risk 
estimator. Unfortunately, I could not obtain the indicators of this model, so I decided to 
create my own estimation model for risk. Given the time constraints, I decided to use a very 
transparent and clear model for assessing the risks that each state faces. This model 
encompasses the following criteria, each used as a dummy variable and each state being 
assigned a value of 1 if they meet the criteria, and a value of 0 otherwise, leading to a 
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maximum possible value of four: 
1. Borders Mexico; 
2. Borders Canada;  
3. Coastal; 
4. Has a mass transit system (subway, metro, or light-rail);  
5. Has a major metropolitan area with a population of 500,000+ (based on 2000 
Census information: U.S. Municipalities Over 50,000). 
Although my risk estimation model is admittedly very rudimentary, it encompasses the 
most basic criteria that would heighten the chance of a terrorist attack, and should suffice 
in explaining whether or not threat is truly a determinant of Homeland Security Grant 
Program funding. This is best explained in a CRS Report for Congress concerning Homeland 
Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology:  
“Terrorism risk analysis and assessment do not exist in a vacuum. Risk is analyzed and 
assessed as a means to mitigate or “buy down” risk over time by developing certain 
capabilities across the country. At DHS, the State Homeland Security Grant Program is 
the primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local partners to 
take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist attack and to 
respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe. Regardless of the complexity 
of the risk assessment methodology, due to the inherent uncertainties associated with 
assessing risk in a dynamic counterterrorism context, some level of flexibility in 
managing risk may be necessary.”13 
                                                        
13 Masse, Todd. O’Neil, Sioban. Rollins, John. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33858. “The Department 
of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress.” 
Published February 2, 2007. Accessed March 29th, 2012. 
                                                       
             
HSGP: An Analysis of the Determinants of Federal Homeland Security Funding to States                                       
                    
Miles 19 
Given the variance of threat models, and the ever-changing nature of terrorism, I feel that 
my choice of simple criteria is justified. Although it could be argued that I could have easily 
included historical sites and major tourist attractions in the model, almost every state 
meets those criteria, and thus they would not allow me to distinguish between different 
levels of threat.  
 
Political Factors: Appropriations, EC/Prez, Gov/Prez, Paired/EM 
 
 
Appropriations—The independent variable Appropriations is based on the total number of 
Representatives a state has on both the House and Senate Subcommittee of Appropriations 
for Homeland Security. Possible values range from 0-6.  
 
EC/Prez—This is a dummy variable, in which states are assigned a value of 1 if their 
Representatives for the Electoral College voted for the winning president in the 2000, 
2004, and 2008 elections, and a value of 0 if they voted for a losing presidential candidate.  
 
Gov/Prez—This is a dummy variable, in which states whose elected Governor’s political 
party affiliation matches that of the sitting president are assigned a value of 1, and a value 
of 0 if the state governor and the president have different political party affiliations.  
 
Paired/EM—This is a dummy variable, in which states whose Homeland Security Office is 
physically shared with their Emergency Management Office or Division of Public Safety (or 
both) are assigned a value of 1, and those whose offices are in different physical locations 
(different buildings) are assigned a value of 0. 
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Control Factors  
I control for state population, based on the 2000 Census, as well as for each state’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) for the years 2003-2010, discounted to reflect 2003 real dollars.  
 
The expected results of relationships are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Expected Impacts 
 
Independent Variable  
Total Domestic 
Preparedness and 
Anti-Terrorism 
Funds  
 
 
CCP  
 
 
EMPG 
 
 
SHSGP  
 
 
LETPP 
 
 
MMRS 
 
 
UASI  
Appropriations  
EC/Prez  
Gov/Prez 
Paired/EM 
Threat 
Population  
GDP 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
 
Research Models 
I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for each of the six grant programs, 
as well as for the total of “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding. To observe 
the effects, I created a panel dataset. Panel data observe the dependent variables across 
time for a set of units, here states, more than once. In my case, the states are observed 
repeatedly for a series of years. Because of lack of published information available 
regarding the dependent variables, my analysis can be thought of as two separate 
regression formulas and two different analyses in general.  
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Model 1 
The first model is a regression of the total amount of funding spent on all “Domestic 
Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” programs across the years 2004-2010.  
The model is specified as: 
Yf = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7  +e _ 
 
Where Yf denotes the total amount funded to states through “Anti-Terrorism and Domestic 
Preparedness” programs, X1 – X7 represent the seven independent variables Appropriations, EC/Prez, 
Gov/Prez, Paired/EM, Threat, Population, and GDP, and e _denotes the random error in the model.  
Or, more specifically: 
Totalf = β0 + AppropriationsX1 + EC/PrezX2 + Gov/PrezX3 
+ Paired/EMX4 + ThreatX5 + PopX6 + GDPX7  + e _ 
 
The sample size of this model is the number of years analyzed, seven (2004-2010), times 
the number of states (plus the District of Columbia), 51, so the total number of 
observations of each variable is 357. The dependent variable, Y, is the total funding 
awarded to states through Homeland Security’s “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-
Terrorism” programs. Table 4 provides the summary statistics for all of the independent 
variables in all models. 
 
Models 2-7 
Models two through seven are regressions of various grant programs over a varying 
number of years.  The CPP, EMPG, SHSGP, MMRS, and UASI grant program allocations were 
analyzed for the years 2003-2006. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program 
(LETPP), however, did not exist in 2003, so its funding was analyzed for the years 2004-
2006.  Funding for each of the 6 programs was regressed on the same variables as in Model 
1. The general model for each of the programs is specified as:  
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Yf = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7  +e _ 
 
Where Yf denotes the amount funded through a certain program, X1 – X7 represent the seven 
independent variables Appropriations, EC/Prez, Gov/Prez, Paired/EM, Threat, Population, and GDP, 
and e _denotes the random error in the model.  
More specifically: 
Programf = β0 + AppropriationsX1 + EC/PrezX2 + Gov/PrezX3 
+ Paired/EMX4 + ThreatX5 + PopX6 + GDPX7  + e_ 
 
The sample size of this model is the number of years analyzed, four (2003-2006), times the 
number of states plus the District of Columbia, 51, so the total number of observations is 
204.  The only exception to this is the LETTP program, which lacks a year compared to the 
others, and thus has 153 observations. The dependent variable, Y, is the amount of funding 
awarded to states through each specific program. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent (Funding)      
Total (2004-2010)  357 103528.2 154487.6 2006 1341808 
CCP 204 402.109 328.714 100 2170 
EMPG 204 7165.196 56967.51 1390 2710 
SHSGP  204 24917.25 21835.25 4160 164280 
LETPP 153 7779.477 6193.998 1500 41270 
MMRS 204 693.823 972.799 0 6670 
UASI  204 13294.41 27928.19 0 202340 
Independent       
Appropriations 561 0.627 0.937 0 6 
EC/Prez 561 0.59 0.492 0 1 
Gov/Prez 561 0.502 0.501 0 1 
Paired/EM 561 0.686 0.464 0 1 
Threat  561 1.569 1.035 0 4 
Population  561 5518077 6108742 493782 33900000 
GDP 561 233000000 281000000 20100000 1670000000 
*All Funding is in thousands of dollars ($000). *Independent variables were observed 51 times each year from 
'04-'10 for Total funding, and 51 times each year from '03-'06, thus 561 observations. *LETPP only existed from 
'04-'06. *Std. Dev = Standard Deviation. *Obs = Observations 
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It may be of concern that some of these variables are collinear in nature. I tested for this, 
and found that none of the political factors were collinear, although Appropriations, GDP, 
and Population are somewhat collinear, as well as Threat, GDP, and Population. Population 
and GDP are almost completely collinear, with R2 =0.9889, as can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5: Collinearity of Variables  
 Appropriations EC/Prez Gov/Prez PairedEM Threat Population 
Appropriations 1      
ECPrez -0.0607 1     
GovPrez 0.0453 0.1187 1    
PairedEM 0.1159 -0.0042 0.0561 1   
Threat 0.3571 -0.0725 -0.0786 0.2084 1  
Population 0.592 -0.018 0.044 0.1102 0.5922 1 
Gdp 0.6052 -0.0365 0.0434 0.1449 0.602 0.9889 
 
Findings  
Model 1: Anti-Terrorism and Domestic Preparedness Funding 2004-2010 
The results of this analysis were not entirely as expected. When analyzing political factors, 
only one of the four variables were statistically significant, and some coefficients were 
negative, contrary to the expected impacts. The coefficient of determination was relatively 
strong (R2=0.7022),  
Perhaps the most surprising find is that the independent variable Threat did not yield to be 
statistically significant, and actually yielded the highest p-value of all independent 
variables, at p=0.874. It also had a negative impact on funding. The fact that threat had no 
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significant effect on grant funding, especially when using a basic threat model, could raise a 
lot of questions.  
Table 6: Results  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
  Total  Non-discretionary 
  Domestic Preparedness 
and Anti-Terrorism 
Total Funding '04-'10 
 
CCP                        
'03-'06 
 
EMPG              
  '03-'06 
Independent Variables  
Political Factors     
 Appropriations  1737.25 -46.34** -4639.249 
 Number of elected officials representing 
each state on the Subcommittee of 
Appropriations for Homeland Security  
(7707.440) (18.374) (5172.962) 
 EC/Prez 33506.31*** -1.462 9265.060 
 States Electoral College Representatives 
voted for the winning President (either 0 
or 1) 
(975.85) (15.196) (8869.656) 
 Gov/Prez -10513.930 6.543 3930.282 
 Political party of the Governor matching 
the party of the President (either 0 or 1)  
(10373.910) (11.339) (4325.852) 
 Paired/EM  1911.320 14.953 -4406.893 
 Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management Paired (either 0 or 1)` 
(6239.540) (12.160) (4771.378) 
Risk factors     
 Threat -1226.590 1.653 6319.805 
 Based on whether or not a state is 
coastal, border, has a major urban 
population, or a mass transit system  
(7710.925) (12.988) (6188.291) 
Control     
 Population  -17578.0** 0.0538*** 18.500 
 Based on 2000 U.S. Census  (8651.00) (0.012) (0.017) 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 730.3*** -0.13 46.00  
  (227100.00) (0.31) (422.00) 
 Constant  -22101.750 101.779 -4892.443 
  (11602.180) (23.848) (7125.231) 
 R2 0.7022 0.9142 0.133 
 Number of Observations  357 204 204 
 Notes. In thousands ($000). Standard errors are robust. Population in millions. GDP in billions. 
 p<.10*; p<.05**; p<.01*** (two tailed).    
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The control variable, Population, however, is statistically significant, although the 
coefficient is very small, and is actually negative, each state receiving approximately $17 
million less for every one million citizens it has (or $17 less per person). GDP also tested 
statistically significant, each state receiving approximately $730,000 for every billion 
dollars grossed. 
The findings of this analysis support that a state’s Electoral College Representatives voting 
for the winning president implies a statistically significant (p=0.001) positive impact on 
funding, averaging $33.5 million more per year for those states, which is an unexpectedly 
large, positive amount of money  
A state’s Governor’s political party affiliation, on the other hand, actually implies a negative 
impact on funding, with those states receiving an average of $10.5 million less in funding 
per year, although this measurement is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, the 
number of Representatives a state has on either the Senate or House Subcommittee of 
Appropriations does not yield a statistically significant result either, although the estimated 
impact is positive, each state receiving $1.7 million more in total funds for every 
representative it has on a Subcommittee, a number that was unexpectedly small. 
Models 2-3: Non-Discretionary  
In analyzing the Emergency Management Preparedness and Citizens Corp non-
discretionary grant programs across the years 2003-2006, the results yielded very little 
statistical significance. The coefficient of determination was strong for the CCP  
(R2=0.9412), but extremely weak  (R2=0.130) for EMPG. This would imply that there is 
something inherently different about the way funds for the two programs are allocated, yet 
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they are supposedly allocated based on the same fair-share formula, where each state is 
guaranteed 0.75 percent of total funds, and the rest is allocated based on population. 
Considering this, it is surprising that population tested statistically significant for the CCP  
(each state receiving a small amount of approximately $53 per million people), while EMPG 
was not significantly affected by population. 
Even more surprising is that although Appropriations was statistically significant for the 
Citizens Corps Program, the coefficient was negative, each state receiving $46,000 less for 
every Representative they have on a Subcommittee of Appropriations for Homeland 
Security. Although not significant, the coefficient for Appropriations was negative for EMPG 
as well.  
Models 4-7: Discretionary 
Models 4-7, the discretionary programs, each had strong positive correlations 
(0.7292≤R2≤0.9472), and resulted in many statistically significant findings. Perhaps the 
most interesting of these findings is that, like the non-discretionary programs, the variable 
Appropriations had a negative coefficient for all programs, two of which were statistically 
significant (p<0.10). For every Representative a state has on a Subcommittee of 
Appropriations for Homeland Security, they receive approximately $43.3 million less in 
State Homeland Security Grant Program funding, and $0.1 million less in Metropolitan 
Medical Response System grant funding. The fact that the coefficient for Appropriations was 
negative for every individual grant program, and was statistically significant for three of the 
six programs, implies that having a Representative on a Subcommittee of Appropriations 
for Homeland Security actually has a strong negative impact on funding.  
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Table 7: Results Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 
  Discretionary  
  SHSGP                
'03-'06 
LETPP                      
'04-'06 
MMRS                  
'03-'06 
UASI                   
'03-'06 Independent Variables  
Political Factors       
 Appropriations  -4330.017* -113.1874 -109.1167* -569.961 
 Number of elected officials representing 
each state on the Subcommittee of 
Appropriations for Homeland Security  
(974.178) (229.661) (63.560) (1270.25) 
 EC/Prez -1773.025 325.243 413.702*** -4070.81* 
 States Electoral College Representatives 
voted for the winning President (dummy 
variable either 0 or 1) 
(1232.902) (247.083) (90.777) (2145.125) 
 Gov/Prez 162.535 -124.463 28.543 213.622 
 Political party of the Governor matching the 
party of the President (dummy variable 
either 0 or 1)  
(958.007) (224.275) (67.447) (2058.131) 
 Paired/EM  2306.107** 192.130 62.350 1105.361 
 Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management Paired (dummy variable either 
0 or 1) 
(977.955) (240.725) (64.470) (148.094) 
Risk factors      
 Threat -305.327 20.854 37.678 -1079.584 
 Based on whether or not a state is coastal, 
border, has a major urban population, or a 
mass transit system  
(977.955) (203.423) (48.472) (1528.889) 
Control      
 Population  5.80** 0.52** 0.0944*** -08.04*** 
 Based on 2000 U.S. Census  (1.05) (0.26) (0.06) 2.63  
 GDP 60.4*** -10.30 -1.12 265.0*** 
  (23.70) (6.45) (1.42) (64.00) 
 Constant  22853.980 3869.162 -225.335 2894.590 
  (1642.737) (369.729) (105.874) (3896.231) 
 R2
 0.9107 0.9472 0.7659 0.7292 
 Number of Observations  204 153 204 204 
 Notes. In thousands ($000). Standard errors are robust. Population in millions. GDP in billions.  
 p<.10*; p<.05**; p<.01*** (two tailed).     
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The variable EC/Prez also yielded two statistically significant results, each state whose 
Electoral College voted for the winning president receiving approximately $0.4 million 
more funding for the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program, yet $4.1 
million less for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program. These results, combined 
with the fact that the variable also tested statistically significant for total “Domestic 
Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding, signifies that there is a significant relationship 
between the way the state’s Electoral College voted and the political party of the president 
that affects funding. However, since the coefficient fluctuates between positive and 
negative, the validity of this relationship is questionable.  
The variable Paired/EM tested statistically significant for the State Homeland Security 
Grant Program, each state receiving approximately $2.3 million more in funds if their Office 
of Homeland Security and Division of Emergency Management or Public Safety physically 
shares an office location.  
Population was significant for every discretionary program, although the coefficient was 
surprisingly negative for the UASI program. GDP was also statistically significant and 
positive for the SHSGP and UASI programs, implying that larger grossing states receive 
more funds. However, the coefficients for the LETPP and MMRS programs were negative, as 
it also was for the non-discretionary CCP program. Although these negative coefficients did 
not prove statistically significant, they lead one to assume that funding may not be heavily 
influenced by a state’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
Interestingly, Threat did not test statistically significant for any discretionary program, 
which is extremely surprising, especially considering that the SHSGP, LETPP, MMRS, and 
                                                       
             
HSGP: An Analysis of the Determinants of Federal Homeland Security Funding to States                                       
                    
Miles 29 
UASI programs are supposedly allocated based on risk. Even more interesting is the fact 
that, similar to total “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-Terrorism” funding, the Threat 
coefficients for the SHSGP and UASI programs were actually negative.  
Conclusions  
The process by which the Department of Homeland Security has been scrutinized, 
speculations circulating that grant funds are allocated as a function of political factors 
rather than terrorism risk. Given the results of the empirical data, there are several 
conclusions that can be made. First and foremost, it is clear that risk, captured by a series of 
fundamental and transparent factors, is not an influencing factor of Homeland Security 
Grant Program Funding. Threat never tested statistically significant for any of the seven 
models, and actually resulted in negative coefficients for the UASI and SHSGP programs, as 
well as for total “Domestic Preparedness and Anti-terrorism” programs funds. 
Furthermore, the variables Appropriations, EC/Prez, and Paired/EM all tested statistically 
significant for at least one program, Appropriations and EC/Prez showing significance more 
multiple programs. This leads me to conclude that funds are allocated as a function of 
politics rather than risk.  
Limitations and Caveats  
There were several limitations, as discussed throughout this study, the following were the 
most problematic of which: 
 Information regarding individual grant program funding to states could only be 
found for the years 2003-2006; 
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 AIR’s Terrorism Loss Estimation Model could not be accessed to use in modeling the 
variable Threat for this analysis; 
 In future research, it might be of interest to include an independent variable for 
“swing vote” states, drawing from Hoover and Pecorino’s theory that those states 
whose Electoral College Representatives didn’t vote for the sitting president, yet 
have a high possibility of doing so in the next election, receive more funding.  
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